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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (R.607–08; 617.) Hence, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
ISSUE 1: Do the discriminatory and excessively burdensome attorneys’ fee and 
costs bond requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104 (“the Bond Statute”) and the 
discriminatory costs undertaking requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601 (“the 
Undertaking Statute”) violate the equal protection, freedom to petition, and due process 
guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions, and the Open Courts Clause of the 
Utah Constitution, both facially and as applied to Appellant Sean Kendall (“Kendall”)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A determination regarding the constitutionality of a 
statute is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court. State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 476; State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2, ¶ 
5, 365 P.3d 1227. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: The issue of the constitutionality—
facially and as applied to Kendall—of the two discriminatory, court-access-obstructing 
bond and undertaking requirements, which call for arbitrary and capricious determinations, 
without any statutory guidelines or procedures, was at the core of, and raised throughout, 
2 
the proceedings in the trial court. (See, e.g., R. 1–2; 5–19; 42–60; 185–86; 188–201; 310; 
323–339; 371; 374–379; 386; 426–27; 543–47; 549–51; 621; 639–652; 777–786.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
United States Constitution, First Amendment: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment: 
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law…. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 1: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; . . . to . . . protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances …. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11: 
All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24:  
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601:  
Actions governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—Undertaking required. 
(1) An action brought under this chapter shall be governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are consistent with this chapter. 
(2) At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a 
sum fixed by the court that is: 
 (a)   not less than $300; and 
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs 
incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fails 
to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104:  
 
Actions against officers—Bond required—Costs and Attorney fees. 
(1) A person may not file an action against a law enforcement officer acting 
within the scope of the officer’s official duties unless the person has posted 
a bond in an amount determined by the court.  
(2) The bond shall cover all estimated costs and attorney fees the officer may 
be expected to incur in defending the action, in the event the officer prevails.  
(3) The prevailing party shall recover from the losing party all costs and 
attorney fees allowed by the court.  
(4) In the event the plaintiff prevails, the official bond of the officer shall be 
liable for the plaintiff’s costs and attorney fees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND ITS 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
 
CONTEXT OF THIS CASE IN UNITED STATES SOCIETY GENERALLY, AND 
IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY 
 
 If it operates with the scales of justice evenly balanced, the judicial system is the 
best, and probably the only, hope in our nation for fair and equal treatment of people, 
regardless of economic status, under the law.1    
If there is to be a semblance of justice that is not subverted by economic status, it 
must come from the Judicial Branch, because it is seldom to be found in the Legislative 
and Executive Branches.2 However, more and more, like the Legislative and Executive 
                                                 
1 The Founders strongly believed that equal application of the law is a prerequisite for a 
free republic. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson’s assertion that “the poorest laborer stood on 
equal ground with the wealthiest millionaire, and generally on a more favored one 
whenever their rights seem to jar.” Thomas Jefferson, Answers to Monsieur de Meusnier’s 
Questions (1786) (quoted in Glen Greenwald, With Liberty and Justice for Some—How the 
Law Is Used to Destroy Equality and Protect the Powerful (“Greenwald”) (2011), at 8.  
See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, where James Madison argued that in the absence of equal 
application of the law, “every government degenerates into tyranny.” (Quoted in 
Greenwald, at 8.)        
2      
Public officials . . . are much more responsive to the privileged than to average 
citizens and the least affluent. . . .  
 
Advantage begets additional advantage. . . . 
 
[G]overnment officials disproportionately respond to business, the wealthy, and the 
organized and vocal when they design America’s domestic and foreign policies.  
 
The bias in government responsiveness toward the affluent is evident not only in 
Congress but also in national government policy more generally.  
 
5 
 
Branches in state and federal government, the courts have been complicit in bringing about 
a two-tiered system of justice—where, for instance, Wall Street fraudsters can escape 
prison or any other legal accountability for their crimes, while Weldon Angelos, a Utah 
native convicted for selling small amounts of marijuana three times when he owned, but 
did not use or threaten anyone with, guns, remains in a penitentiary under a 55-year 
sentence. 
 A two-tiered system of justice has developed, where the rich and powerful inside 
and outside of government can escape accountability for their Republic-destroying 
contempt for and violation of the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws passed by Congress,3 
while the law is often applied with a vengeance against those without wealth and without 
power.4 
                                                 
“American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality,” Task Force on Inequality and 
American Democracy, American Political Science Association (2004), 
http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/taskforcereport.pdf 
(last visited March 31, 2016),  at 1, 10, 14 (emphasis added). 
 
3 For instance, there has been no accountability for the powerful people who authorized or 
ordered torture of people in foreign nations, in violation of numerous international treaties 
(which are among the “supreme law of the land” under Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the 
Constitution) and federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. 2340A, see, e.g., El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), and illegal warrantless mass surveillance, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (2013).  
4 The United States, with the world’s highest incarceration rate, has only 5 percent of the 
world’s population, yet almost 25 percent of all prisoners in the world. Greenwald at 223.  
“Class inequalities in incarceration are reflected in the very low educational level of those 
in prison and jail. . . . State Prisoners average just a tenth grade education and about 70 
percent have no high school diploma.” Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, “Incarceration & 
social inequality,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Dӕdalus, Summer 2010), 
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 The overarching question, societally as well as in this particular case, is whether 
wealth and power will be permitted to determine one’s access to fundamental justice, 
including access to the courts for the vindication of crucial state constitutional and other 
legal protections, or will the astounding inequities based on wealth and power be permitted 
to pervert any sense of equal justice for all?  
NATURE OF THE CASE 
 This appeal challenges the blatant unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-
7-601 and 78B-3-104, which place discriminatory, arbitrary, and unreasonable—in some 
instances insurmountable—burdens on people, with or without substantial financial 
resources, who seek access to the courts to vindicate their rights under Utah law to hold 
law enforcement officers accountable for their misconduct. 
 This case arises out of the tragic, unconscionable killing of Kendall’s best friend, 
his Weimaraner dog Geist, by a Salt Lake City Police officer who was unconstitutionally 
trespassing during an illegal warrantless search in Kendall’s backyard.  
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Kendall seeks accountability, under the guarantees of the Utah Constitution and 
other state legal protections—as well as under federal law—for the illegal trespass and 
killing of Geist. In doing so, Kendall has encountered the arbitrary and discriminatory 
burdens imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601 (the “Undertaking Statute”) and § 78B-
                                                 
 https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=808 (last visited 
March 31, 2016).  
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3-104 (the “Bond Statute”), which prohibit a prospective plaintiff from accessing the courts 
without first paying a bond and providing an undertaking in amounts arbitrarily set by the 
court, without any statutory guidelines or procedures for setting the amounts and without 
any showing by the Defendants/Appellants (“City and Police Officers”) that the case fell 
within the category of cases—“frivolous” cases—the Bond Statute was purportedly 
intended to discourage. 
The Undertaking Statute and Bond Statute, which caused a nine-month delay in 
filing the Complaint under state law for the unconstitutional and otherwise unlawful actions 
by the City and Police Officers, deprived Kendall of his constitutional rights to due process, 
equal protection, the right of access to justice through the courts, and the right to petition 
the government. These are all deprivations that would not be obstacles to (1) plaintiffs 
suing people other than peace officers and (2) plaintiffs (perhaps only multi-millionaires) 
for whom a significant bond requirement, to cover all potential fees and costs for all 
defendant law enforcement officers, would not be a deterrent against pursuing justice under 
state legal guarantees.  The challenged statutes also allow inequitable protections for the 
narrow classes of “peace officers” (under the Bond Statute) and governmental entities and 
employees (under the Undertaking Statute) that are not afforded other people or entities.    
Kendall appealed from the District Court’s Memorandum Decision (R.543–52) and 
Order (R. 580–82), which held that the Bond and Undertaking Statutes are constitutional, 
to the Utah Supreme Court. (R.585-602.) Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition on November 17, 2015. On December 9, 2015, the Supreme Court determined 
it would not retain this appeal. (R.617.) On December 10, 2015, this Court issued an order 
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denying Appellees’ Motion for Summary Disposition, noting “[t]he issues framed by the 
motion and response present policy and law issues that are not appropriate for summary 
disposition.”  
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court determined that: (1) the Bond Statute and the Undertaking Statute are 
constitutional; (R. 549–51.); (2) Kendall met the criteria for impecuniosity in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-2-302 and was therefore not required to file a bond pursuant to the Bond 
Statute (R. 548–49); and (3) Kendall was required to file an undertaking in the amount of 
$300, which amount was arbitrarily selected, without any explanation by the Court, and 
imposed without any guidance from the Undertaking Statute, other than a statement as to 
the minimum amount for an undertaking (R. 548–49).  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 A. THE TRAGIC AND ILLEGAL KILLING OF GEIST. 
 On June 18, 2014, a three year-old child was reported missing from his home located  
in Salt Lake City, Utah (the “Child’s Home”). (R.43.) Joseph Allen Everett, Tom 
Edmundson and George Pregman, all officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
were sent to search the Child’s Home. (R.43.) The child was, in fact, asleep in the basement 
of the home, but the officers did not find him. (R.44.) As a result of their failure to locate 
the child during their searches (if, in fact, they did conduct searches), additional Salt Lake 
City Police officers were called to conduct a door-to-door search of the area. (R.43.) Brett 
Olsen (“Olsen”) was among the officers who participated in the search. (R.43.) 
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 Sean Kendall lived approximately 1/8 mile from the Child’s Home. (R.44.) During 
the search for the supposedly missing child, Olsen approached Kendall’s home. (R.44.) 
Despite the facts that no one was at home, no consent for a search was provided, Olsen did 
not have a warrant to search Kendall’s home or yard, and there was no reasonable cause to 
believe there was any nexus whatsoever between Kendall’s property and the missing child, 
Olsen opened the gate leading to Kendall’s backyard adjacent to his home (“the curtilage”), 
entered the curtilage, and proceeded to conduct an invasive search of the backyard and a 
shed located there. (R.44; 66–67.) Upon entering the yard, Olsen was approached by 
Kendall’s beloved 2 1/3 year-old Weimaraner dog Geist, who, doing what dogs do, ran 
toward Olsen and barked. (R.44; 67.) Olsen outrageously and unnecessarily drew his gun 
and fired two rounds, killing Geist. (R.44; 67.) 
B. KENDALL FILED THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION 
BECAUSE OF THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE PROCESS 
INVOLVED IN SETTING THE AMOUNT OF THE UNDERTAKING 
AND BOND, THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING REQUIRED BY 
THE BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES, THE 
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT ON KENDALL AND OTHERS 
SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE COURTS AGAINST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FOR THEIR WRONG-DOING, AND 
BECAUSE OF THE PROSPECT THAT ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
WOULD BE UNJUSTLY DELAYED, IMPERMISSIBLY 
BURDENED, AND PERHAPS DENIED BECAUSE OF THE 
INEQUITABLE UNDERTAKING AND BOND STATUTES. 
 
  Kendall served an Amended Notice of Claim on Salt Lake City Corporation and 
the individual defendants pursuant to another special-interest, discriminatory statute,            
§ 63G-7-401, on January 26, 2015. (R. 21-34.) That same day, Kendall filed a complaint 
in the Third District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the Bond and 
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Undertaking Statutes violate Kendall’s and other plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to due 
process, equal protection, access to the courts, and right to petition the government.5 (R.1–
19.)  
 Kendall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a declaration that the Bond 
and Undertaking Statutes are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Kendall. 
(R.185-201.) Kendall submitted affidavits and live testimony from two attorneys 
experienced in civil rights lawsuits, Randall K. Edwards and Robert Sykes, showing that 
the amount of attorney fees and costs defendants could incur in this action is far more than 
Kendall could pay and that any attempt to predict the amount of future fees and costs would 
require “pure conjecture and speculation.” (R.226-33; 720–28; 734–39.) He also presented 
evidence, by means of affidavits and live testimony, from two insurance agents, as well as 
personal testimony, that he would be unable to secure a bond for that amount based on his 
income and assets. (R.235–45; 660–85; 711–20.)  
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and a motion to strike the affidavit of legal counsel for the City and Police Officers on 
September 15, 2015. (R.621-815.)  
C. THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED AN ERRONEOUS RULING 
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BOND AND 
UNDERTAKING STATUTES. 
                                                 
5 Subsequent to the ruling in this Declaratory Judgment action, in November 2015 Kendall 
filed a second action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by 
conducting a warrantless search of his backyard and killing Geist, and also alleging a 
variety of tort claims, including trespass, conversion, negligence and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Third Dist. Ct. Civ. No. 150907410 (Blanch, J.). That action was 
subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah, where it 
currently is pending. (Case No. 2:15-cv-00862). 
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The trial court ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment on September 21, 2015. 
(R.592-600.) The trial court never provided any explanation as to how it set the amount of 
the undertaking but held that Kendall had sufficient funds to cover an undertaking of $300, 
which the court ordered. (R.598.)  
Curiously, the trial court failed to determine the amount of “estimated costs and 
attorney fees the officer[s] may be expected to incur in defending the action,” as required 
by Utah Code § 78B-3-104, yet found Kendall to be “impecunious.” (R. 598.) The trial 
court failed to explain what it meant by “impecunious” in the context of what amount 
would otherwise be required to be posted as a bond.  Determining the amount of estimated 
fees and costs is a necessary precondition to finding that a plaintiff cannot afford to pay 
that amount under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-302(2). 
The court erroneously upheld the constitutionality of the Bond and Undertaking 
Statutes, although the statutes had delayed Kendall nine months in pursuing his substantive 
claims against the City and Police Officers and put him through extensive, time-
consuming, costly, and anxiety-laden litigation (R. 681–685) in a patently discriminatory 
and oppressive manner.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 Before a person claiming injury because of the unlawful conduct of a law 
enforcement officer can gain access to the courts for the vindication of rights and 
protections under the Utah Constitution and other state laws, the potential plaintiff must 
first file a bond in the amount a court estimates to be the costs and attorney fees the officer 
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“may be expected” to incur in the action.  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104. Another statute 
requires that all those seeking recovery in a civil action against a governmental entity or 
employee must file “an undertaking” “conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable 
costs incurred by the governmental entity . . . if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or 
fails to recover judgment.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601.  
 The bond requirement is imposed on only those seeking justice under state law for 
injuries caused by police misconduct. Plaintiffs suing any other persons or entities, or those 
who invoke the protections of only federal law, are not required to post such a bond. 
Likewise, only law enforcement officers enjoy the unjust protections afforded them from 
the discriminatory burdens imposed on those who seek to file civil claims against them.  
These egregiously discriminatory statutes provide no due process standard for the 
ascertainment of the bond and undertaking amounts, and no procedure for determining (1) 
if the particular case or prospective plaintiff falls within the category of cases or plaintiffs 
of reasonable concern to the legislature in passing the statutes; (2) the reasonableness of 
the amount of the bond and/or undertaking; or (3) the extent and nature of the burden 
imposed on the prospective plaintiff by the bond or undertaking requirements.    
The City and Police Officers claim that the bond requirement is justified by a 
legislative desire to deter frivolous lawsuits. However, they have provided no evidence that 
there is any greater problem relating to frivolous claims facing law enforcement officers 
than others against whom claims may be made. Further, the bond statute violates equal 
protection and due process guarantees, as well as the guarantees of access to the courts, 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions, insofar as they impermissibly burden or 
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completely prevent meritorious lawsuits by those who cannot afford, or who are otherwise 
deterred, by the bond and attorney fee provisions of the Bond Statute. At the same time, 
the Bond Statute permits frivolous lawsuits by those with sufficient resources (or temerity) 
to post the bond and pursue the claims. 
Both of the statutes require an unconstitutional taking because the price of 
admission to the courts is the posting of a bond and undertaking in amounts arbitrarily fixed 
by a court—which could be hundreds of thousands of dollars in the case of the Bond 
Statute—in a manner not required of plaintiffs who do not sue governmental entities or 
employees, without any due process, and in an arbitrary, capricious, and oppressive manner 
that prevents or unjustly burdens the fundamental right of access to the courts. 
ARGUMENT 
The Bond  and Undertaking Statutes violate federal and state constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing equal protection under the law, due process, and access to the 
courts under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution and the Petition Clauses of 
the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. 
I. ON THEIR FACE AND AS APPLIED TO KENDALL, THE 
DICRIMINATORY AND BURDENSOME BOND STATUTE AND 
UNDERTAKING STATUTE VIOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE LAW. 
 
As applied in this matter, Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation.”) should initially be treated as “a state-law counterpart to the 
federal Equal Protection Clause.” See State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶¶ 34–35, 308 P.3d 
517. “Despite their dissimilar language, these two constitutional provisions ‘embody the 
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same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons 
in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.” 
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d 1069 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 669 (Utah 1984)). “Both constitutional provisions incorporate the ‘[b]asic principles 
of equal protection of the law [that] are inherent in the very concept of justice and are a 
necessary attribute of a just society.’” Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting Malan, 693 P.2d at 670). “That 
equal protection is ‘essential to a free society’ is ‘explicitly stated . . . in Article I, § 2 of 
the Utah Constitution: “[A]ll free governments are founded on their authority for [the 
people’s] equal protection and benefit....”’” Id. (quoting Malan 693 P.2d at 670) 
(alterations in original).      
The Utah Supreme Court “generally incorporates principles from the federal equal 
protection regime,” State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44 at ¶ 36, n. 9, while reserving “the right to 
depart from those standards.” Id. Under Utah law, the equal protection analysis is at least 
as rigorous as under the federal Constitution and, in some instances, can be even more 
strict.  See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 
1988) (“[T]o pass state constitutional muster, a legislative measure must often meet a 
higher de facto standard of reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal courts.”) 
The initial governing standard is to inquire “(a) ‘what classifications the statute 
creates,’ (b) ‘whether different classes . . . are treated disparately,’ and then (c) ‘whether 
the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity’ among any 
classifications.” DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 93, ¶ 49, 364 P.3d 1036 
(citing State v. Canton,  2013 UT 44, ¶ 35, 308 P.3d 517).  
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 The last inquiry “incorporates varying standards of scrutiny.” Id. at ¶ 50, (quoting 
State v. Canton,  2013 UT 44, at ¶ 36).  The third step “recognize[s] that most classifications 
are presumptively permissible, and thus subject only to ‘rational basis review.’” Id.  
However, heightened scrutiny must be applied in cases involving “discrimination on the 
basis of a ‘fundamental right.’” Id. See also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 
UT 30, ¶ 30, 116 P.3d 295, 301 (“we review statutory classifications that implicate rights 
protected by the open courts clause under ‘heightened scrutiny’”); Gallivan v. Walker, 
2002 UT 89 at ¶ 40.  Hence, heightened scrutiny must be employed under article I, section 
24 “when reviewing legislation that ‘implicates’ rights under article I, section 11.” Judd v. 
Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 19, 103 P.3d 135. (Citing Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 581 (Utah 
1993)). “Sustaining legislation against an article I, section 24 challenge alleging that one’s 
rights under the Open Courts Clause are constitutionally discriminated against requires the 
court to find that the challenged legislation ‘(1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a 
speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and 
substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further 
a legitimate legislative goal.’” Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 19, 103 P.3d 135. (Quoting 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 583).   
 The requirement of the Bond Statute to post a bond in the amount a judge speculates 
may be the estimated costs and attorney fees to be incurred by a law enforcement officer 
in the future, and the additional requirement for an undertaking in an amount a judge, in 
his or her unfettered, arbitrary discretion, determines to impose under the Undertaking 
Statute, clearly “implicate” the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.  The Bond 
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and Undertaking Statutes may very well preclude a person like Kendall from gaining access 
to the courts or, as a practical matter, will deter many, if not most, people from seeking to 
vindicate their rights under Utah law because it might put at risk a large portion, if not all, 
of their financial resources. Of course, only the most reckless, intrepid, or extremely 
wealthy would be willing to risk perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees and costs, 
and pay a premium and post collateral for a bond in that amount, as the price of admission 
to the courts to hold law enforcement officers accountable for their violations of legal 
protections under Utah law. 
“In order for a law to be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws 
provision, ‘it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the 
operation of the law be uniform.’” Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 Utah 89 at ¶ 37 (quoting Lee 
v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993))  (emphasis added). In other words, the effects 
of the law in the real world are to be considered when determining if a statute has an 
unconstitutionally discriminatory impact. Here, the effect of the Bond Statute is the 
slamming of the court doors, or the imposition of unjust and discriminatory burdens, on 
people of almost all economic classes with meritorious claims against law enforcement 
officers who have caused harm by their unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful conduct. 
Robert Sykes: [V]ery few, I think I could count on the fingers of one hand, how 
many clients I’ve had that could afford to pay, say $5000, you know. They’re mostly 
poor, frequently people of color. They don’t have the money to fund the litigation 
and if you were to tell them, hey, you’re at risk, my friend, for, you know, tens of 
thousands of dollars, even $12,000, they wouldn’t do it, they’d walk away from 
their rights.  
 
(R. 739.) 
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Question [Mr. Anderson]: And have you ever filed an action on behalf of a plaintiff 
where the plaintiff had to file a bond for future attorney’s fees and costs under 78B-
3-104? 
Answer [Robert Sykes]: Never. 
Q: Would you—do you know of any clients that you have right now that would even 
be able to do that or that would be willing to do that or undertake the threat of 
attorney’s fees? 
A: No. Able—probably none of them willing—if they had the money, probably 
none of them have the money to do it. That is an absolute bar in essence to any 
constitutional action for most people, for most people, okay? 
 
(R. 744.) (Emphasis added.) 
 
Question [Mr. Anderson]: So have you had any experience with clients who were 
of limited financial means that have not pursued state law claims after you disclosed 
to them that they would have to put up a bond in an amount found by the court to 
cover future attorney’s fees and costs? 
Answer [Randall Edwards]: Yes, most of the clients that I have who have 
confrontations with the police in which they believe that there has been some 
violation of their rights, are people who do not have the financial resources to pursue 
it if they had to pay for the other side’s attorney’s fees or for that matter if they had 
to pay me by the hour.  
Q: And what’s been the impact on them in terms of their decision as to whether to 
seek justice in our courts? 
A: They finally just shake their heads and say there is no justice and they just 
walk away.  
 
(R. 727-28.) (Emphasis added.) 
 
 Under either the rational basis test or the heightened scrutiny test, the Bond Statute 
and the Undertaking Statute fail to meet the test under the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
U.S. and Utah Constitutions and the uniform operation of laws provision in article I, section 
24 of the Utah Constitution.  
A. The Bond Statute and Undertaking Statute Fail to Pass Muster Under the 
Rational Basis Test. 
 
As noted above, the following must be asked concerning a statute analyzed under 
the rational basis standard:  
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1. What classifications are created by the statute? 
2. Are different classes treated disparately? 
3. Is the disparity among any classifications warranted by any reasonable 
objective the legislature may have had? 
 
See DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 93, ¶ 49, 364 P.3d 1036. 
 
 1. Among the numerous classifications created by the statute are the following:  
(1) Between (a) people who have legal claims against police officers and (b) those 
who have claims against anyone other than police officers;  
(2) Between (a) plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs who cannot afford to post, or the 
vast majority of people who would be substantially burdened and likely deterred from 
pursuing justice in the courts by the prospect of being required to post, a bond in an amount 
estimated by a court prior to the filing of a complaint, without any statutory provision for 
a due process hearing and without any statutory guidelines for making the determination 
as to the bond amount and (b) those who are not deterred, because of their unusual wealth 
or temerity, from paying a premium for a bond, and posting collateral, in an amount that 
might equal hundreds of thousands of dollars in estimated attorneys’ fees and costs that 
will be incurred in the future. 
(3) Between (a) plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs who have meritorious claims, yet 
are still required to post a bond under the Bond Statute and (b) those who seek to file 
frivolous claims against peace officers (examples of which the City and Police Officers 
have wholly failed to provide throughout the proceedings in the court below). 
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(4) Between (a) plaintiffs who suffer a taking without due process (i.e., being 
deprived of the amount that must be paid as a premium for a bond or undertaking, and the 
collateral that must be provided for a bond or undertaking) under the Bond Statute and the 
Undertaking Statute and (b) plaintiffs who suffer no taking as a pre-condition to filing a 
lawsuit. 
(5) Between (a) defendants or prospective defendants who are peace officers and 
beneficiaries of the special, discriminatory treatment under the Bond Statute and (b) any 
other persons who may be named as defendants in lawsuits, meritorious or frivolous, who 
do not benefit from the discriminatory Bond Statute. 
(6) Between (a) defendants other than governmental entities or employees who can 
be sued without the plaintiffs having to post an undertaking under the Undertaking Statute 
and (b) defendants who are governmental entities or employees who cannot be sued unless 
the plaintiffs post an undertaking arbitrarily set by the court, without any standards or 
procedures provided by the Undertaking Statute. 
 2. Obviously, the different classes are treated disparately: 
(1) Plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs seeking access to the courts to hold police 
officers accountable face enormous, often impossible, hurdles not faced by any other 
plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs. 
(2) Those injured by police officers violating the Utah Constitution or other Utah 
laws, even if they can technically afford to pay for a bond, are exposed to tremendous 
burdens that are not faced by victims injured by people or entities other than police officers. 
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(3) Plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs seeking to sue police officers suffer a taking 
without due process of law in the form of either (a) the temporary loss of use of money 
posted as a bond or (b) the permanent loss of money that must be paid as a premium, and 
the collateral that must be provided, to obtain a bond—all without any determination at a 
due process hearing of whether their claims fall within the category of cases (i.e,. frivolous 
cases) purportedly sought to be deterred by the Bond Statute, the reasonableness of the 
bond, and the ability of the plaintiff to pay the bond. 
(4) Police officers enjoy the protections, including the prohibitive effects, of the 
Bond Statute, while no one else enjoys such protections against those they have unlawfully 
injured. 
(5) Governmental entities and employees enjoy the protections, including the 
prohibitive effects, of the Undertaking Statute, while no one else enjoys such protections 
against those they have injured. 
3.  The enormous disparities between classifications are not warranted by any 
reasonable legislative objectives. The City and Police Officers, citing Zamora v. Draper, 
635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981), have characterized the objective behind a statutory requirement 
for a bond to cover future costs and attorneys’ fees as “discouraging frivolous lawsuits and 
to ensure . . . that if a lawsuit is brought that has no merit6 and the City prevails . . . then 
                                                 
6 Contrary to the characterization by legal counsel for the City and Police Officers, there is 
nothing in either the bond statute addressed in Zamora or the current Bond Statute that 
limits recovery of attorneys’ fees to cases involving “frivolous” claims. Under those bond 
statutes, attorneys’ fees are recoverable to the prevailing party regardless of whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims are meritorious. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104(3) (“The prevailing 
party shall recover from the losing party all costs and attorney fees allowed by the court.”) 
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there’s an ability to put up the attorney’s fees which are awarded to both sides.” (R. 648.)  
But Zamora, which did not engage in any equal protection analysis, expressly noted that 
the concern regarding “frivolous and/or vexatious lawsuits” is not unique to lawsuits 
against police officers: 
It is suggested that indiscriminate allowance of the filing of such suits is contrary to 
the express wording of the statute and defeats its purpose of affording protection to 
peace officers against frivolous and/or vexatious lawsuits by compelling them to 
come forward and defend. A pertinent rejoinder to this is that the danger of filing 
meritless actions also exists as to other kinds of lawsuits. It is the responsibility of 
the courts not only to see that the purpose of the statute in protecting police officers 
is served, but also to safeguard the rights of persons who claim they have suffered 
injury. 
 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d at 81.   
 
 The City and Police Officers have repeatedly argued that the bond statute considered 
in Zamora is “virtually identical” to the Bond Statute at issue here. (R. 326-27; 646-47; 
786-87.) Also, the trial court misread the current Bond Statute as allowing the same 
flexibility that the Court in Zamora found existing in the bond statute under consideration 
in that case. (R. 546.)  However, the repealed statute at issue in Zamora and the current 
Bond Statute are vastly different in terms of whether a trial court has discretion in setting 
the amount of the bond.7 
                                                 
7 In Zamora, the Utah Supreme Court found “that the statute itself allows some flexibility 
wherein it provides that the bond shall be ‘in an amount fixed by the court . . . .’ This would 
permit the court to fix the bond in accordance with the plaintiff’s circumstances, however 
impoverished he may be, and yet allow him access to the court to seek justice, as assured 
by Sec. 11 of Article I of our State Constitution . . . .” Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d at 81. 
The plain language of the current Bond Statute at issue in this case is completely different. 
In language far different than the bond statute at issue in Zamora, the current Bond Statute 
provides in mandatory, non-discretionary terms that “[t]he bond shall cover all estimated 
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Considering the discriminatory imposition of an attorneys’ fee bond (and the 
prospect of having to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff is not successful at 
trial, even in a meritorious case) when public officials were sued, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court noted as follows: 
The statute now before us would . . . [make] it extremely costly, if not prohibitive, 
for minority groups or individuals to bring suit against any public official (school 
board member, police officer, police juror) for the redress of grievances suffered 
costs and attorney fees the officer may be expected to incur in defending the action, in the 
event the officer prevails.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104 (emphasis added). 
The sponsor of the current Bond Statute, then an employee of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff’s Office (Leigh Dethman, “Biskupski takes job at the sheriff’s office,” Deseret 
News, June 5, 2007, http://deseretnews.com/article/660226823/Biskupski-takes-job-at-
the-sheriffs-office.html?pg=all), represented to other legislators that the current Bond 
Statute was simply part of a recodification—a renumbering—of pre-existing statutes: 
Rep. Jackie Biskupski (at 34:02): “What this bill does is we’re recodifying and 
doing some technical cleanup from legislation that we passed last year. . . . So it’s a 
renumbering that’s occurring in the bill, and then there is [sic] technical changes.” 
Rep. Ray (at 39:20): “Does this have any statutory changes or are we just 
recodifying and putting them in different areas of the code?”   
Rep. Biskupski (at 39:24): “That’s correct, no statutory changes, only 
recodifications. Revisions, technical revisions as well.”  
House Day 1 Statements of Members of Utah House of Representatives (January 21, 2008) 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=17195&meta_id=509623.  
But that was not true.  H.B. 78 (2008), entitled Title 78 Recodification and Revision, 
reflects mostly amendments and renumbering of many sections of the Utah Code. 
However, it expressly “repeals” Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-10, the statute construed in 
Zamora. It also expressly “enacts” entirely new legislation, the current Bond Statute, 
which, according to its plain language, removes any of the discretion the Court in Zamora 
found to rescue the earlier statute from unconstitutionality. H.B. 78 Enrolled, “Title 78 
Recodification and Revision” (2008 General Session, State of Utah), 
http://le.utah.gov/~2008/bills/hbillenr/HB0078.pdf, at 1412 (repeal of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-11-10) and 895 (enactment of new Bond Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104).
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because of race. The statute classifies litigants as either public officials or those not 
public officials. Public officials can recover attorney’s fees if the plaintiff is 
unsuccessful, and obtain a bond for attorney’s fees before trial. Defendants who are 
not public officials can recover attorney’s fees only in certain kinds of cases as 
provided by statute.  
Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So.2d 1291, 1293-94 (La. 1982). 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, addressing the identical issue posed here, noted the 
equal protection violations under the state and federal constitutions arising from the 
different classes of tortfeasors and different classes of victims created by the discriminatory 
bond and attorneys’ fee statute applied only to lawsuits against public officials, as follows: 
This statutory scheme creates a classification which substantially burdens the right 
of some persons to be compensated for injuries suffered by them while not placing 
such a burden on other individuals. Such classifications are permissible only if they 
are: 
“reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that 
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. . . .” Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed.2d 989, 990-
991 (1920). [Other citations omitted.] 
It is argued that the bond requirement is a justifiable means to deter frivolous suits 
instituted against public officials for harassment. No support for the suggestion that 
suits are brought against public officials for harassment with greater frequency than 
suits against other defendants has been presented in brief or in argument. 
A similar statute was invalidated in Sheffield v. State, 92 Wash.2d 807, 601 P.2d 
163 (1979), on an equal protection ground. In that case, the court summarily struck 
down a provision which entailed the filing of a surety bond contemporaneously with 
institution of suit against the state, relying on Hunter v. North Mason High School, 
85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). Hunter dealt with a “nonclaim” statute which 
required notice of claims against governmental entities to be given within 120 days 
from the date the claim arose. The court held that, even under minimal scrutiny, the 
statute bore no reasonable relation to its asserted purposes—it unjustifiably 
discriminated against persons with claims against the government in violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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“ . . . This prerequisite to tort recovery has no counterpart in actions between 
private parties. The statutes thus create two classes of tortfeasors, 
governmental and nongovernmental, and grant the one a procedural 
advantage not available to the other. Concomitantly they produce two classes 
of tort victims and place a substantial burden on the right to bring an action 
of one of them.” Hunter v. North Mason High School, supra, 539 P.2d at 847. 
 
In the case before us, the instant statute also divides tortfeasors into two classes; 
governmental tortfeasors and private tortfeasors. Simultaneously two classes of 
victims are created: victims of governmental tortfeasors and victims of private 
tortfeasors. Only the first class of victims must suffer the additional burden of a 
bond for attorney’s fees. No reasonable justification for this disparate treatment has 
been supplied. The statute violates the equal protection clauses of the state and 
federal constitutions. 
 
Id. at 1295–1296 (emphasis added). 
 
 Similar to the situation in Detraz, the City and Police Officers have not presented 
any evidence supporting a claim that law enforcement officers are subjected to more 
frivolous claims than anyone else8—or that whatever dangers are encountered by law 
enforcement officers are so great, or the interactions by law enforcement officers with 
people during the course of their duties are such, that they are exposed to so many frivolous 
claims to justify blocking, or significantly burdening, access to the courts for those who 
have meritorious claims regarding harm suffered as a result of misconduct by law 
enforcement officers.  
  
                                                 
8 “There’s been nothing offered, nothing factual, no studies showing that there is any kind 
of unfairness or more frivolous cases brought against police officers than anybody else.” 
(Argument of Kendall’s counsel at evidentiary hearing, R. 78-82, which was not rebutted 
by counsel for the City and Police Officers.) 
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B. The Bond Statute and Undertaking Statute Fail to Pass Equal Protection 
Muster Under the Heightened Scrutiny Test 
 
Under the applicable heightened scrutiny test, the Bond Statute and the Undertaking 
Statute must be shown to (1) be “reasonable,” (2) have “more than a speculative tendency 
to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially further[] a valid 
legislative purpose,” and (3) be reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative 
goal.” Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91 at ¶ 19. 
 Utilizing what appears to be that same test, the Alaska Supreme Court held a bond 
requirement for out-of-state plaintiffs suing in-state residents in Alaska to be a violation of 
equal protection.  In Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375 (Alaska 1988), the 
Court began with the proposition that “an unlitigated claim is considered a property 
interest,” and that “the claim cannot be taken away from the plaintiff by government action 
without due process of law.” Id. at 1378. Construing the right to court access under the 
Alaska Constitution to be an “important right,” the Court held that “[s]tatutory 
infringement upon that right is deserving of close scrutiny.” Id. at 1379. The Court then 
held the statute to be “both overinclusive and underinclusive”—in the same ways in which 
the Bond Statute and Undertaking Statute in this case are both overinclusive and 
underinclusive.  
 In Patrick, the bond imposed on only out-of-state plaintiffs was “overinclusive 
because it requires that a bond be posted by all nonresident plaintiffs.” Id. As the Court 
noted, it cannot be “assumed that all nonresident plaintiffs will be uncooperative in paying 
cost and attorney fee awards entered against them.” Id. Likewise, in this case, it cannot be 
26 
 
assumed that Kendall or other plaintiffs resorting to the courts after suffering abuses by 
police officers, as compared with plaintiffs in matters not involving police officers, will be 
particularly uncooperative in paying cost and attorney fee awards (if such awards 
eventually occur)—or that their claims, as compared with the claims of plaintiffs in cases 
not involving police officers, will more often be frivolous.  
 The Court in Patrick continued: “[T]he statute is underinclusive because it assumes 
that only nonresident plaintiffs will be difficult debtors. The statute ignores the fact that 
resident plaintiffs also may be uncooperative in paying cost and attorney fee awards and 
that defendants may have a more difficult time collecting from illiquid resident plaintiffs 
than from liquid foreign plaintiffs.” Id. Likewise, as concerns this case, people seeking to 
hold law enforcement officers accountable under the law have not been shown to be more 
apt to file frivolous claims than any other plaintiffs. The conclusion of the Court in Patrick 
applies with full force to the situation presented here: 
We conclude that a statute which restricts access to Alaska courts by means of a 
bond requirement for only nonresident plaintiffs is not sufficiently related to the 
purpose of providing security for cost and attorney fee awards to defendants to 
withstand a challenge under the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection 
under the law. 
 
Id. at 1380. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court was faced with a similar equal protection issue 
where an Oregon statute required appellants in an eviction case to post bond on appeal, 
with two sureties, in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending an appellate 
decision, the bond to be forfeited if the decision in favor of eviction was affirmed. Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The purported purpose of the bond statute, as explained by 
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the Oregon Supreme Court, “was to guarantee that the rent pending an appeal would be 
paid,” and the double-bond “was, no doubt, intended to prevent frivolous appeals for the 
purpose of delay.” Scales v. Spencer, 424 P.2d 242, 243 (Or. 1967) (quoted in Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. at 76). Just as the bond and undertaking requirements impose 
discriminatory and significant burdens on people who seek access to the courts to hold 
police officers accountable for their misconduct, the double-bond requirement in Lindsey 
was held by the United States Supreme Court to “heavily burden[] the statutory right of an 
FED defendant to appeal.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 77.  
 The Court, holding that the bond requirement violated equal protection, stated as 
follows: 
The claim that the double-bond requirement operates to screen out frivolous appeals 
is unpersuasive, for it not only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable 
to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford the bond.   
 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 78. 
  
 Not only the poor are impacted by such facially discriminatory legislation.  Those 
who are not indigent are also unconstitutionally burdened in ways that other parties to 
litigation are not: 
The discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but 
cannot post the double bond, is particularly obvious. For them, as a practical matter, 
appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be. The nonindigent 
FED appellant also is confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other 
civil litigant in Oregon. The discrimination against the class of FED appellants is 
arbitrary and irrational, and the double-bond requirement of [the statute] violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
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 Precisely the same is true in the instant case. The Bond and Undertaking Statutes 
bar or unduly burden meritorious claims by those who cannot, or will not, put at risk 
substantial sums of money to obtain justice for violations of state law by law enforcement 
officers, while allowing frivolous claims by those who are wealthy and tenacious enough 
to remain undeterred by the arbitrary and discriminatory Bond and Undertaking Statutes.  
 Statutes like the Bond and Undertaking Statutes, which (1) deny access to courts for 
people with meritorious claims who cannot afford the bond or are prohibitively deterred or 
unduly burdened by the discriminatory bond requirement, but (2) allow access to the courts 
by wealthy people with frivolous claims who are not deterred by the bond requirement, are 
blatantly unconstitutional under state and federal equal protection guarantees.   
Obviously, the purported goal of preventing frivolous claims has no relation to the 
financial status of litigants.   
The cost bond statutes in Eastin [v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977] and New 
[v. Arizona Board of Regents, 618 P.2d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)] did not have a 
rational basis. The purpose of the statutes was to deter frivolous litigation. The 
frivolity vel non of litigation is not related to the financial status of the litigants. By 
denying access to the courts to indigents with meritorious claims and granting it to 
the wealthy with frivolous claims, the bond provisions of the statutes were grossly 
overinclusive and underinclusive. The defects were so great that it cannot be said 
they rationally furthered a legitimate legislative purpose. 
 
Tahtinen v. Superior Court, 637 P.2d 723, 725 (Ariz. 1981) (in banc). 
 
 Whether one is indigent or not, the bond and undertaking requirements are 
unconstitutional. 
As to the indigent, the statute [requiring a claimant in a medical malpractice case to 
post a bond] violates the Arizona constitutional privileges and immunities clause, 
Art. II, s 13, by denying access to the courts. As to the non-indigent, it places a 
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heavier burden upon his access to the court and therefore violates the same clause 
of the Arizona Constitution. 
 
Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (Ariz. 1981) (in banc). See also New v. Arizona 
Bd. of Regents, 618 P.2d 238, 239–40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).  (“The bond requirement . . . 
is a monetary blockade to access to the courts and is therefore violative of constitutional 
rights.”) 
II. BECAUSE THEY UNREASONABLY BURDEN ACCESS TO THE 
COURTS BY IMPOSING AN ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE 
PRICE OF ADMISSION TO THE COURTS, THE BOND AND 
UNDERTAKING STATUTES VIOLATE THE PETITION CLAUSES 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
 
The Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, section 11, and the Petition 
Clauses of the United States Constitution (First Amendment) and the Utah Constitution 
(Art. I, section 1) all guarantee fair and equal access to the courts. Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) (“The clear language of the [open courts] section 
guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and 
equality.”); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 28, 5 P.3d 616, 625 (“The right of access to the 
courts and to a civil remedy to redress injuries, which Article I, section 11 protects, is 
fundamental in Anglo-American law.”); Borough of Duryea, Pa.. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 
2488, 2494 (2011) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984)) (“[T]he 
right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to 
petition the government.”). The right of access is a fundamental First Amendment right, 
requiring strict scrutiny of any restriction. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 
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U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (“the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment 
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 31 (1968) (“‘only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the 
State’s constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.’” 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 at 438 (1963)). To meet that standard, the 
infringement of a First Amendment right must be “actually necessary” to achieve a solution 
to an “actual problem.” Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).    
 Declaring unconstitutional a bond requirement, intended to cover defendants’ 
attorneys’ fees and costs, imposed on those who sue medical review board participants, the 
Florida Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We find that the bond requirement does not totally abrogate a plaintiff’s right of 
access to the courts; however, the statutes do create an impermissible restriction on 
access to the courts. The constitutional right of access to the courts sharply restricts 
the imposition of financial barriers to asserting claims or defenses in court. Although 
courts have upheld reasonable measures, such as filing fees, financial preconditions 
that constitute a substantial burden on a litigant’s right to have his or her case heard 
are disfavored. . . . The right to go to court to resolve our disputes is one of our 
fundamental rights. . . . Although courts generally oppose any burden being placed 
on the right of a person to seek redress of injuries from the courts, the legislature 
may abrogate or restrict a person’s access to the courts if it provides: 1) a reasonable 
alternative remedy or commensurate benefit, or 2) a showing of an overpowering 
public necessity for the abolishment of the right, and finds that there is no alternative 
method of meeting such public necessity. 
 
Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 423–24 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis in original). 
 After finding that the bond requirement does not provide a plaintiff with an 
alternative remedy or a commensurate benefit, the Florida Supreme Court held the fees and 
costs bond violative of the open courts provision because the “record in the case does not 
show that the bond requirement is the only method of furthering” the purpose of the bond 
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statute, “meeting the medical malpractice crisis and encouraging peer review.” Id. at 424–
25.  
 A discriminatory bond requirement, the amount of which is to be determined in an 
astoundingly arbitrary manner, and which operates on the very wealthy in a manner 
differently than on nearly everyone else, cannot constitutionally be applied to determine if, 
and under what circumstances, a person will have access to the courts for the vindication 
of state rights under the Utah Constitution or other state laws.   
To address the concern about potentially frivolous lawsuits, a Utah statute of general 
application provides that fees and costs can be assessed against those who assert claims or 
defenses without merit.  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.  See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971) (“[O]ther alternatives exist to fees and cost requirements as a 
means for conserving the time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous litigation, 
such as penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or 
abuse of process, to mention only a few.”) 
III. ON THEIR FACE AND AS APPLIED TO KENDALL, THE BOND 
STATUTE AND THE UNDERTAKING STATUTE VIOLATE 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
 
The Bond Statute and the Undertaking Statute violate substantive and procedural 
due process (1) by denying access to the courts, or at least making access so expensive (or 
potentially expensive) as to effectively prohibit or unreasonably burden plaintiffs—no 
matter their economic status—seeking to bring state claims against law enforcement 
officers; (2) by discriminating between plaintiffs on the basis of their economic status; (3) 
by discriminating between defendants on the basis of whether they are peace officers or 
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anyone else who are claimed to have harmed others through their violations of Utah law; 
(4) because the statutes do not provide any guidance as to how, and according to what 
procedures, the amounts of the undertaking and bond are to be set, inviting 
unconstitutionally arbitrary enforcement by requiring the trial court to impossibly intuit 
how much costs and fees will be incurred in the future; and (5) by allowing an  
unconstitutional taking of property (i.e., the lost use of money posted as a bond or the 
payment of a premium for a bond and providing collateral) and perhaps the loss of one’s 
meritorious claim, without a due process hearing to determine (a) whether the case is of 
the category the Bond and Undertaking Statutes are intended to discourage (i.e., frivolous 
cases) and (b) what bond amount, if any, would be appropriate under the circumstances, 
taking into account the nature and extent of any burden of the bond on a person seeking 
access to the court and the impossible, arbitrary ascertainment of how much in attorneys’ 
fees and costs will be incurred in the future.  Further, the Bond Statute violates substantive 
and procedural due process because the purported rationale of the statute is to deter 
frivolous claims, when that supposed interest is not advanced by the statute because the 
statute deters meritorious claims and permits those with substantial resources to pursue 
frivolous claims.   
A. The Bond Statute And The Undertaking Statute Deny or Unduly Burden 
The Right To Access Justice Through The Courts, In Violation of Due 
Process. 
 
Utah courts apply a rational basis standard of review to claims alleging due process 
violations. “[I]f a statute has ‘a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [is] 
neither arbitrary or discriminatory, it is constitutionally permissible.’” State v. Candedo, 
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232 P.3d 1008, 1013 (Utah 2010) (citations omitted). The Bond and Undertaking Statutes 
fail this test on both counts, as they are not reasonably related to a proper legislative 
purpose and are arbitrary and discriminatory, facially and as applied to Kendall. 
1. The Bond and Undertaking Statutes Are Not Reasonably Related to a Proper 
Legislative Purpose. 
 
In Zamora v. Draper, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a version of the Bond Statute 
on the grounds that it prevented frivolous lawsuits and “provide[d] a measure of protection 
to that class of officers who are willing to undertake th[e] hazardous responsibility [of 
maintaining the peace and good order of society].” Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80. As noted above, 
the Zamora court was considering a materially different bond statute than is at issue here. 
The former statute read:  
Before any action may be filed against any sheriff, constable, peace officer, 
state road officer, or any other person charged with the duty of enforcement 
of the criminal laws of this state, or service of civil process, when such action 
arises out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty, or in any action 
upon the bond of any such officer, the proposed plaintiff, as a condition 
precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, and at the time of filing the 
complaint in any such action, a written undertaking with at least two 
sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned upon 
the diligent prosecution of such action, and, in the event judgment in the said 
cause shall be against the plaintiff, for the payment to the defendant of all 
costs and expenses that may be awarded against such plaintiff, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court. In any such action, the 
prevailing party therein shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise 
provided, recover from the losing party therein such sum as counsel fees as 
shall be allowed by the court. The official bond of any such officer shall be 
liable for any such costs and attorney fees. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-10 (emphasis added). The language of that previous bond statute 
was clearly more flexible than the current Bond Statute, which requires that a bond “shall 
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cover all estimated attorney fees and costs.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104 (emphasis 
added).  
The trial court in this matter dismissed the distinction, stating, erroneously, that “the 
Utah Supreme Court has already held the bond statute is constitutional.” (R.550.) The 
Zamora court, however, found that the “flexibility” allowed under the previous version of 
the statute was critical to its constitutionality because it permitted the court to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry as to the plaintiff’s ability to furnish a bond and to set the amount of 
the bond accordingly. 635 P.2d 78, 81–82. There is no such flexibility in the language of 
the current Bond Statute; accordingly, the reasoning of Zamora does not apply and the trial 
court’s reliance on that opinion is misplaced.     
Further, the Defendants and the trial court relied heavily on the argument that the 
Bond Statute eliminates frivolous claims, which argument has been examined and rejected. 
In Psychiatric Assoc. v. Siegel, the Florida Supreme Court considered the effect of a similar 
bond statute on a plaintiff’s due process rights. 610 So.2d 419, 425 (Fla. 1992). The Court 
in Siegel found the bond statute unconstitutional, in part because it “infringe[d] on the 
plaintiff’s due process rights by not being reasonably related to the legislative goal of 
preventing frivolous lawsuits.” Id. at 421.  
Under the bond requirement statutes, all plaintiffs, regardless of the merits of their 
claims, must post a bond before proceeding with their action. This requirement will 
not necessarily discourage frivolous lawsuits of the rich, but only those lawsuits 
where the plaintiff is too poor to post the bond. Thus, the effect of the bond 
requirement is to discourage lawsuits based on the plaintiff’s financial ability rather 
[than] the merits of the claim. Further, under the bond requirement, a plaintiff with 
a complex meritorious case would have to post a larger bond than a plaintiff with a 
simple but frivolous case. Thus, . . . “[t]his kind of provision may net some sharks, 
but only at the price of also netting a substantial number of innocent fish.” . . . We 
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find that this result is not reasonably related to the permissible legislative goal of 
preventing frivolous lawsuits filed for intimidation or leverage. 
 
Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel, 610 So.2d at 425 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Other courts have similarly determined that bond and undertaking statutes that limit 
or prohibit access to courts on the basis that frivolous lawsuits might be deterred are 
unconstitutional. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 78 (statute requiring that appellant 
obtain two sureties was not likely to prevent frivolous lawsuits “for it not only bar[red] 
nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post the bond but also allows meritless 
appeals by others who can afford the bond.”); Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So.2d at 1295  
(rejecting the argument that a bond requirement deterred frivolous lawsuits where there 
was “[n]o support for the suggestion that suits are brought against public officials for 
harassment with greater frequency than suits against other defendants.”).  
The Bond Statute has resulted in gross injustices in at least three federal court cases, 
which have been dismissed because of the plaintiffs’ failure to post the required bond, 
without any consideration of the crucial constitutional issues, and without any 
determination that the claims of the plaintiffs were frivolous. See Rippstein v. City of Provo, 
929 F.2d 576, 578 (10th Cir. 1991); Mglej v. Garfield Co., 2014 WL 2967605, at *2 (D. 
Utah July 1, 2014); Webb v. Scott, 2015 WL 1257513, at *14 (D. Utah Mar. 18, 2015) 
reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 2183124 (D. Utah May 8, 2015).  
In order to obtain a determination by the trial court of his constitutional claims 
regarding the Bond Statute and the Undertaking Statute, and to obtain a resolution that 
permitted him to proceed with his substantive state claims against the City and Police 
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Officers, Kendall spent significant funds and was subjected to a delay of nine months. (R. 
670-72; R. 19 (Complaint dated January 26, 2015); R. 551 (Memorandum Decision dated 
September 21, 2015).) Accordingly, while the Bond and Undertaking Statutes do not bar 
all lawsuits against government entities and officials, they clearly have the real effect of 
denying, or significantly burdening and unreasonably delaying, access to the courts for a 
determination of people’s claims, particularly against law enforcement officers, on the 
merits. 
2. The Bond and Undertaking Statutes Call For an Impossible and 
Arbitrary Determination by the Courts of What Future 
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Will Be.  
 
 The Bond and Undertaking Statutes violate a prospective plaintiff’s due process 
rights because they require the courts to engage in an impossible, speculative, arbitrary 
guess about what fees will be incurred in the future.   
[T]he bond requirement statutes are distinguishable from statutes that award a 
prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees at the conclusion of a case. Under these 
latter statutes, the court can accurately measure the reasonableness of the fees; 
whereas the bond requirement statutes compel the court to intuit the appropriate 
attorney’s fees and costs in advance of any action. 
 
Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel, 610 So.2d at 425. See also Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 
535 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal 1975) (in banc) (invalidating a costs undertaking statute in part 
because the “legislation specifie[d] no standards for determining the reasonable amount of 
such undertaking” and without such standards, any hearing would “not be a ‘meaningful’ 
hearing, ‘appropriate to the nature of the case’ and as such would not meet due process 
standards.” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 485, 552 (1965)).  
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As in Beaudreau, neither statute at issue here promulgates standards or guidelines 
for setting the amount a litigant must pay in order to bring his or her claim. The Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes allow the courts nearly unlimited discretion in setting the amounts of 
the undertaking and bond. The statutes are silent as to how the court should determine the 
amount of the bond, the factors a court must or should consider in setting the bond, or the 
procedure a court should follow in determining the amount of bond. Thus, before the filing 
of a complaint, a court is left to determine, without any guidance from the statutes or the 
benefit of an inquiry into the merits of the claim, the entire amount of attorney fees and 
costs that could possibly be incurred in the future in defending the action, plus an 
additional, seemingly random and duplicative costs undertaking. As was made clear in this 
case during the evidentiary hearing before the trial court,9 making a determination about 
                                                 
9 Question [Mr. Anderson]: And have you read through the Amended Notice of 
Claim in this case? 
Answer [Randall Edwards]: I have. 
Q: Exhibit 2. And you’re familiar with the basic claims that Mr. Kendall seeks to 
pursue? 
A: I am. 
Q: And if called upon to, given your vast experience in this area, would you have 
any basis whatsoever before a complaint is filed or even soon thereafter in 
determining what the likely fees and costs are going to be for any of the parties? 
A: Oh heavens no. But can I give a little context to that? 
Q: Please. 
A: As we look at the statute which I have looked at, the statute actually makes no 
sense and so in order for us to look at someone to say here’s how they could be 
compliant with the statute and pay and in determining how much you would have 
to come up with, there’s no way that that could be done. 
  *   *   *   * 
Q: And are you ever able to tell in advance with any precision whatsoever what kind 
of time or fees are going to be involved? 
A: No. 
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future costs and fees is an impossible task and one that cannot result in anything other than 
an arbitrary number chosen by the court, based on conjecture and speculation.10 
                                                 
 
R. 722-23.  
 
Question [Mr. Anderson]: Okay. And you stated in the affidavit you submitted in 
this case an estimate of what you think the attorney’s fees might be in the future and 
the range that you gave was from $100,000 to $750,000 or more. 
Answer [Robert Sykes]: Could easily be. 
Q: And why such a range: 
A: It’s impossible when you sit down to begin the case to estimate. You don’t know 
how hard they’re going to fight. . . . But you can’t estimate that. Up front you don’t 
know how hard the other side is going to fight and that’s the problem. . . . You can 
make a general estimate but that’s why I gave you that range, that big range because 
you don’t know how hard they’re going to fight. It’s one of the problems with it. 
Q: Would it, would any kind of estimate be based on conjecture, speculation? 
A: Oh, it would be very speculative. It would be very speculative.  
Q: Alright, and do you know, you looked at the Bond Statute, (inaudible) 3-104? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you know of any procedure that’s provided for under that statute for 
ascertaining the amount of bond? 
A: There’s no procedure. 
Q: Is there any standard? 
A: There’s no standard and I think there’s no case law. When I checked I couldn’t 
find a case on it. So, you know, it’s just wide open. 
Q: And how does one get into a court for a court’s determination before you even 
file the complaint? 
A: I don’t know how that would be done except maybe the way you’re doing it right 
now. 
Q: Nine months later since we filed — 
A: Yeah, nine months later. 
A: —the complaint. 
Q: Yeah. 
 
R. 737–39. 
 
10 The testimony of two experienced civil rights attorneys estimated the range of the amount 
of attorneys’ fees and costs to be incurred on behalf of the individual Police Officer 
Defendants at between $30,000 to more than $500,000 (R. 266) and between $100,000 to 
$750,000 or more. (R. 270.) One of them, Randall Edwards, noted that “even a reasonable 
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B. The Bond and Undertaking Statutes Constitute an Unconstitutional 
Taking Without Due Process. 
                                                 
estimate is impossible to predict before the conclusion of the case without engaging in 
gross speculation,” that “[c]ertainly there is no possible way to estimate the amount of 
attorneys’ fees and costs that will be incurred prior to the commencement of a lawsuit,” 
and that arriving at such an estimate “would not only be administratively impossible, . . . 
but would in any case require gross speculation.” (R. 266.)  
 
The City and Police Officers demonstrated how prospective defendants can manipulate the 
process by (1) driving the number up so it will be out of reach of the prospective plaintiffs, 
see Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel, 610 So.2d at 425 (“the bond requirement may have 
the unwanted effect of encouraging defendants to estimate costly defenses for all claims in 
order to obtain a prohibitively high bond”), or (2) driving it down in an effort to somewhat 
ameliorate the due process and equal protection concerns.   
 
In egregious violation of the prohibition against a lawyer also acting as a witness on 
contested matters, and following strenuous objections by Kendall’s counsel (R. 626–31; 
755; 768–773), the trial court permitted legal counsel for the City and Police Officers to 
present by means of affidavit and live testimony the only evidence on behalf of his clients 
regarding an estimate of future attorneys’ fees and costs—an absurd, self-serving figure of 
$12,000.  (R. 352; 756.)  Lawyers are prohibited from also being witnesses on contested 
matters. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1991) (“[I]t was 
improper for [a party’s lawyer] to submit his affidavit and remain as counsel for [his client]. 
. . .[W]e deem it to be generally inadvisable for members of the bar to testify in litigation 
where they personally represent a party. The need for the testimony of counsel must be 
compelling and must be necessary to preserve the cause of action . . .”); State v. Leonard, 
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985) (“Experience teaches that the roles of advocate and witness 
should be separated.”). See also United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“That counsel should avoid appearing both as advocate and witness except under special 
circumstances is beyond question.”); Reed v. Ford Motor Co., 679 F.Supp. 873, 875 (S.D. 
Ind. 1988) (“attorneys of parties to litigation generally are not proper witnesses, including 
at the summary judgment stage”); Haberer v. First Bank of South Dakota, 429 N.W.2d 62, 
65–66 (S.D. 1988) (“[A]ttorneys must be cautioned when using affidavits in support of a 
motion for summary judgment, or any affidavits with respect to litigation. Clearly, the 
affidavits must not deal with contested matter or facts, or otherwise give evidence 
regarding matters that would be questions of fact.”); Aghili v. Banks, 63 S.W.3d 812, 818 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“the appearance of a testifying advocate tends to cast doubt on the 
ethics and propriety of our judicial system. . . .’The practice of attorneys furnishing from 
their own lips and on their own oaths the controlling testimony for their client is one not to 
be condoned by judicial silence. . . .Nothing short of actual corruption can more surely 
discredit the profession.’” (citation omitted)).  
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A person cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. The requirement of the Undertaking Statute to post a costs bond 
in an amount set by the court when one seeks to hold a governmental entity or employee 
legally accountable in the courts and the requirement under the Bond Statute for posting a 
bond in the amount of future attorneys’ fees and costs to be incurred by a law enforcement 
officer constitute an unconstitutional taking, in violation of due process under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions.  
It is not enough to say that the Legislature was seeking to deter frivolous cases by 
imposing the bond and undertaking requirements. It must be shown, during a due process 
hearing, that each particular case in which a bond or undertaking is required is of the 
category of cases sought to be deterred. That is, it must be shown at a hearing that the case 
is not meritorious if a bond is to be required. 
A “claim against a public entity or public employee—assuming that it is bona fide 
and potentially meritorious—is a ‘property interest’ within the meaning of the due process 
clause.” Beaudreau v. Superior. Court, 535 P.2d at 718. See also Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶ 40, 44 P.3d 663 (“Causes of action or claims that have accrued under 
existing law are vested property rights just as tangible things are property”); Payne v. 
Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987) (“[A] vested right of action is a property right 
protected by the due process clause.”). Also, the requirement of an undertaking constitutes 
a taking of property since a nonrefundable premium is required to secure an undertaking 
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or bond and, in addition, collateral may be required.11 See, e.g., Brooks v. Small Claims 
Court, 504 P.2d 1249,1253 (Cal. 1973).12 Hence, before a costs or attorneys’ fees bond or 
undertaking can be required as a condition to filing a lawsuit, due process requires a hearing 
to inquire into the merits of the case, the appropriateness of the bond, and the ability of the 
plaintiff to pay the bond.  
Under the fundamental notions of due process. . . , the taking to which a plaintiff is 
subjected under the above [cost undertaking] statutes must be preceded by a hearing 
in the particular case in order to determine whether the statutory purpose is 
                                                 
11  Q  [Mr. Anderson]: Did you check with Platt River Insurance Company regarding 
the availability of a bond? 
 A [Michael Brown]: Through a brokerage company that has a contract with Platt 
River, yes. 
 Q: And what were the terms of that bond going to be if Sean [Kendall] would have 
qualified? 
A: The indication was three percent of the bond requirement would be the premium 
and 100 percent collateral.  
. . . .  
Q: You say collateral. Besides paying the premium, you have to put up collateral? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And in what form? 
A: Cash or cash equivalent, CD, Bank line of credit or a bank guarantee letter in the 
name of the insurance company. 
Q: And would that be in the full amount of the bond? 
A: Yes. 
 
R. 713–14. 
 
12 “[W]e are convinced that [costs undertaking statutes] involve a two-fold taking of 
property. To put it another way, a plaintiff is deprived of his property whether he complies 
with the statute and files the demanded undertaking or refuses to comply and incurs 
dismissal of his action. If he takes the former course and secures his undertaking from a 
corporate surety . . . he will at least be deprived of his nonrefundable premium; if he 
deposits money in court in lieu of an undertaking, he will be deprived of its use during the 
pendency of the action. If the plaintiff takes the latter course and incurs dismissal of his 
action, he will also have suffered a ‘taking’ of his property, since his claim against a public 
entity or public employee . . . is a ‘property interest’ within the meaning of the due process 
clause.” Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d at 717–18.  
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promoted by the imposition of the undertaking requirement. As these statutes are 
purportedly designed to protect public entities and public employees against the cost 
of defending frivolous lawsuits, a due process hearing would necessarily inquire 
into the merit of the plaintiff’s action as well as into the reasonableness of the 
amount of the undertaking in the light of the defendant’s probable expenses. 
 
Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d at 720. See also Gonzales v. Fox, 68 Cal. App.3d 
Supp. 16, 18–19 (Cal. App. 1977) (statute requiring nonresident plaintiffs to file a bond in 
a suit against the county for personal injuries violated due process because it did not 
“provide a meaningful pretaking hearing” that would inquire into merits of claim, 
reasonableness of bond, and the ability of plaintiffs to pay bond).  
In Beaudreau, the California Supreme Court invalidated statutes requiring plaintiffs 
suing a school district and public employees to post an undertaking. 535 P.2d at 720–21. 
The Court held that the California statutes at issue effectuated a taking inasmuch as “a 
plaintiff may be required to relinquish property either by filing an undertaking or by 
suffering dismissal of his action.” Id. at 718. Since the undertaking statutes amounted to a 
taking, therefore, the Court found that plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled to a pretaking 
hearing “in order to determine whether the statutory purpose is promoted by the imposition 
of the undertaking requirement.” Id. at 720.  
Here, as in Beaudreau, the Bond and Undertaking Statutes do not require or permit 
a pretaking hearing, let alone any inquiry into the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, the 
reasonableness of the bond, or the litigant’s ability to pay a bond. Every person seeking to 
bring a lawsuit against a police officer in Utah must post the bond or prove his or her 
impecuniosity and every person seeking to sue a governmental entity or employee must 
post an undertaking, in the arbitrary (and, in part, duplicative) amounts set by the court, or 
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forego his or her claims. Further, the Bond Statute does not allow the court discretion in 
fixing the bond according to a particular plaintiff’s circumstances; rather, the statute 
requires that the amount of the bond “shall” cover “all estimated costs and attorney fees.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104. Accordingly, the Bond and Undertaking Statutes violate due 
process under the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Bond Statute and Undertaking Statute are symptomatic of the trend throughout 
government, and in the judicial system specifically, of the growing inequities between the 
rich and powerful (including governmental entities and employees) and everyone else. The 
scales of justice are indeed severely tilted against ordinary men and women, with 
insurmountable, or at least unconscionably burdensome, obstacles for just about everyone 
seeking justice for injuries inflicted through misconduct by governmental entities and 
employees, generally, and law enforcement officers, specifically. If equal protection, due 
process, and the constitutional guarantees of equal access to the courts have any practical 
meaning, the order of the trial court should be reversed and the Bond Statute and 
Undertaking Statute must finally be deemed unconstitutional, consistent with the 
compellingly reasoned case law throughout the nation that has recognized the abuses of 
such statutes—and consistent with the principle at the core of our constitutional republic 
that no one is above the law and all must be treated equally, without regard to their 
economic, political, or social status.  
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